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DODD-FRANK, REGULATORY INNOVATION,
AND THE SAFETY OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PRODUCTS
MELISSA B. JACOBY*
Among the many components of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),' few
received as much mainstream attention as the creation of the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau).2 As originally
contemplated, the Bureau was meant to make credit products
safer for households and the economy at large. However, the
Bureau has faced strenuous opposition from the financial services
industry and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce(with its
"stopthecfpa.com" website), among others.
*George R. Ward Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Thanks to Don Hornstein and Kim Krawiec for helpful discussions, to Lissa Broome,
Adam Feibelman, Katie Porter and Mark Weidemaier for feedback on an earlier
draft, and to Mika Chance, Douglas DeBaugh, and Michelle Merck Walker for
research and editorial assistance.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C).
2. For evidence of this point, see Garance Franke-Ruta, Saturday Night Live
Stars Unite Behind Consumer Financial Protection Agency, WASH. POST (Mar. 3,
2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/03/star-power-unites-behind-
consu.html.
3. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY 8-19 (2007); Elizabeth
Warren, Redesigning Regulation: A Case Study from the Consumer Credit Market,
(The Tobin Project Conference At White Oak, Gov't & Mkts.: Toward a New
Theory of Regulation, Working Paper, Feb. 1-3, 2008); Elizabeth Warren & Oren
Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PENN. L. REv. 101, 106 (2008).
4. Stop the CFPA, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.stopthecfpa.com
(due to the inclusion of the creation of the Bureau in Dodd-Frank as enacted, the
website is no longer operational and redirects to http://www.cfpbspotlight.com/).
5. Brody Mullins, Chamber Ad Campaign Targets Consumer Agency, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 8,2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125236911298191113.html; Karen,
Weise, How a Consumer Protection Agency Would Work, PUBLIC BROADCASTING
SERVICE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/creditcards/themes/howprotect.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2011). Public written commentary of financial services industry
representatives tended to be less critical, presumably due to fallout from the financial
crisis and the bailout. E.g., Brady Dennis & Steven Mufson, Bankers Lobby Against
Financial Regulatory Overhaul, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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My goal in this brief commentary is to question a prevalent
set of critics' assertions about the Bureau's regulatory approach.
Upon review, each lacks a firm foundation in Dodd-Frank as
enacted.
A core theme of objectors' complaints is that the Bureau
embodies a traditional command and control approach. The
Bureau was said to "open the floodgates of regulatory overreach,"
to anoint a "consumer protection czar," to become "a new
unchecked federal super agency to meddle in every day financial
6interactions," and the like. Some expressly complained that the
Bureau will "take away freedoms," including the freedom to make
ill-fated financial decisions. Related objections are that people
will be worse off because the Bureau will constrict credit8 and that
dyn/content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805370_2.html?sid=ST2010031805667
(discussing how banking lobbyists were reluctant to be publicly critical of new
regulation); Steve Bartlett, Statement at the Financial Services Roundtable: A New
Day For Financial Services 6 (June 8, 2010),
http://www.fsround.org/media/pdfs/NewDaySpeech.pdf ("We made some real
mistakes with credit cards."); id. at 10 ("We have concerns about the design of a new
agency separate from safety and soundness regulators, but we will make it work.").
However, presumably no one refutes the basic point that the financial services
industry opposed a stand-alone agency as well as states' rights to set higher consumer
protection standards.
6. Senator Richard Shelby called this agency an "enormous regulatory
overreach" that will burden small business owners and empower bureaucrats and
leave significant decisions up to the whim of a "consumer protection czar." Richard
Shelby, U.S. Senator, Statement: Orthodontists Could Be Covered by New Onerous
Consumer Protection Laws (Apr. 30, 2010). Senator Mike Enzi predicted the bureau
would "punish" small businesses that would be crushed by huge regulatory burdens,
would "open the flood gates of government involvement," and would be "a new
unchecked federal super agency to meddle in every day financial interactions." Mike
Enzi, U.S. Senator, Statement: Enzi Slams Big Brother Super Agency; Co-sponsors
Changes With Checks, Balances, Less Government Intrusion (May 6, 2010)
[hereinafter Enzi statement]. Representative Jed Hensarling complained that the
Bureau wanted to substitute citizens' judgments with the judgments of a "whole army
of bureaucrats" and described the Bureau as an example of the Obama
administration wanting to inject itself into every small corner of citizens' lives. Jeb
Hensarling, U.S. Congressman, Statement (June 25, 2010), available at
http://hensarling.house.gov/news/weekly-updates/2010/06/privacy-06- 2 5 -2 010.shtml.
A U.S. Chamber of Commerce representative complained of a "massive new
bureaucracy" and a "bureaucratic jumble" insulated from veto by other government
actors. Letter from David T. Hirschman to The Honorable Neil S. Wolin, Deputy
Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury, (Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Hirschman
Letter].
7. E.g., Enzi statement, supra note 6.
8. Hirschman Letter. See also THOMAS DURKIN, THE IMPACT OF THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGENCY ON SMALL BUSINESS, U.S. CHAMBER OF
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this agency's scope extends too far to cover small businesses such
as doctors and dentists.!
Politicians and industry representatives were not alone in
sounding these alarms; some full-time academics have recently
echoed the same super-agency themes and warnings about the
Bureau as ultimately enacted.o These academic opponents
essentially allege that the Bureau will substitute borrowers'
judgment and preferences with that of Bureau employees, and that
the Bureau's creation reflects the view that more government
regulation is inherently better than less.n
It is worth reflecting on the objectors' claim - standard in
debates of this nature - that the Bureau will constrain people's
freedom to pursue their individual preferences. This is factually
unsupported with respect to Dodd-Frank's creation of the Bureau.
COMMERCE CENTER FOR CAPITAL MARKET COMPETITIVENESS 20-23 (2009)
(commenting on predecessor to version of the Bureau that ultimately was enacted);
Scott Garrett & Parker Griffith, U.S. Representatives, Statement: The Dodd Bill Is
Bad for Taxpayers (May 6, 2010), available at
http://garrett.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=184 43 6
(suggesting that Bureau will use concerns about safety to restrict credit availability
for home mortgages and student loans).
9. For example, in his blog (and cross-posted at BigGovernment.com), Senator
Jim DeMint called the creation of the agency "just another power grab" that will hurt
small businesses and families. Senator Jim DeMint, 'Brace' Yourself Wall Street
Regulation Bill Snares Dentists, Doctors & Patients, JIM'S BLOG (May 5, 2010)
http://demint.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=JimsBlog (navigate by date). He
claimed that the potential adverse effect on small businesses such as orthodontists,
and the kids who need the braces, is itself "a good reason to oppose" the entire
financial reform bill. Id. An American Enterprise Institute scholar suggested that
Bureau oversight would "eliminate" some small businesses. Peter J. Wallison, The
Dodd-Frank Act: Creative Destruction, Destroyed, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB.
POL'Y RES. 5 (July-Aug. 2010). DeMint and others predicted that unmanageable
administrative burdens imposed by the Bureau would lead service providers like
dentists and doctors to stop allowing patients to pay in installments, which would
discourage patients from seeking necessary treatment. Id. This line of critique
culminated in a letter from the American Dental Association, the American Medical
Association and other groups requesting a clearer exemption from the Bureau's
oversight. Letter from American Dental Association et al. to Chris Dodd, Chairman,
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs (May 3, 2010).
10. Truth on the Market "Free to Choose" Symposium (Dec. 6-7, 2010),
http://truthonthemarket.com/free-to-choose-symposium/ (critiquing Bureau and
research underlying it featuring commentaries by Professor Richard Epstein of the
University of Chicago and New York University and Professor Larry Ribstein of
University of Illinois, among others).
11. E.g., Richard Epstein, Contribution to the Truth on the Market "Free to
Choose" Symposium (Dec. 6-7, 2010), http://truthonthemarket.com/free-to-choose-
symposium/.
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But it also reflects the questionable proposition that true
individual preferences adequately explained credit product
selection prior to Dodd-Frank. Consider the recent study by
economist Susan Woodward that finds, after controlling for a
variety of other factors, that African Americans and Latinos pay
more in closing costs on their Federal Housing Authority-insured
loans than white borrowers.12 Would objectors really claim that
this reflects a preference to pay more for the same product, or that
this is an inevitable consequence of the "right to be wrong?" There
are innumerable other examples of documented problems in
consumer credit markets about which we could ask the same
questions.
In any event, as Professors Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein have observed, a regulatory framework can enhance the
exercise of people's own judgment. A closer look at the structure
and substance of the Bureau as provided in Dodd-Frank indicates
that it is quite consistent with the Thaler and Sunstein model.
Dodd-Frank's creation of the Bureau does not fulfill its
credit safety objective through mandating some credit products
and banning others. Rather, it aims to facilitate a credit
marketplace where borrowers can clearly understand the full costs
of products and engage in better comparison shopping.14 There is
12. SUSAN WOODWARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, A STUDY OF
CLOSING COSTS FOR FHA MORTGAGES, ix, 45-48 (May 2008), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411682 fhamortgages.pdf. This study and its
implications are discussed in RICHARD H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 136 (rev'd and
expanded edition 2008).
13. RICHARD H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 244 (rev'd and expandeded. 2008).
14. Dodd-Frank Act § 1022 states:
(B) OBJECTIVES.- The Bureau is authorized to exercise its authorities under
Federal consumer financial law for the purposes of ensuring that, with respect to
consumer financial products and services -
(1) consumers are provided with timely and understandable
information to make responsible decisions about financial
transactions;
(2) consumers are protected from unfair, deceptive, or abusive
acts and practices and from discrimination;
(3) outdated, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome regulations are
regularly identified and addressed in order to reduce
102 [Vol. 15
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a spectrum of approaches that can be deployed to this end. Dodd-
Frank's establishment of the Bureau reflects the belief that
government has some role to play in overcoming problems in this
credit market." But this belief already was underlying the existing
consumer credit laws that the Bureau will oversee, and the
financial crisis bolstered the justifications for this view.
unwarranted regulatory burdens;
(4) Federal consumer financial law is enforced consistently,
without regard to the status of a person as a depository
institution, in order to promote fair competition; and
(5) markets for consumer financial products and services operate
transparently and efficiently to facilitate access and
innovation.
(C) FUNCTIONS.- The primary functions of the Bureau are -
(1) conducting financial education programs;
(2) collecting, investigating, and responding to consumer
complaints;
(3) collecting, researching, monitoring, and publishing
information relevant to the functioning of markets for
consumer financial products and services to identify risks to
consumers and the proper functioning of such markets;
(4) subject to [provisions addressing specific types of covered
persons], supervising covered persons for compliance with
Federal consumer financial law, and taking appropriate
enforcement action to address violations of Federal consumer
financial law;
(5) issuing rules, orders, and guidance implementing Federal
consumer financial law; and
(6) performing such support activities as may be necessary or
useful to facilitate the other functions of the bureau.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 1021(b)-(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1980 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511). The
Bureau's Director also must collect data on consumer complaints about financial
products and to report annually to Congress. Dodd-Frank Act § 1013(b)(3)(C) (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5943).
15. Reza Dibadj, Four Key Elements to Successful Financial Regulatory Reform, 6
HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 377, 378 (2010) ("[Mlarkets need rules. Government's role is to
create the backdrop and regulations to assure free, open markets that operate in the
public interest. Consistent with new research in regulatory design, the objective of
reform is not to override markets, but rather to ensure fair and open participation in
markets.").
16. The Bureau is charged to "regulate the offering and provision of consumer
financial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws." Dodd-
Frank Act, §1011(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491). It has the ability "to
implement and, where applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial law
consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for
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Some may fear regulatory overreach because the Bureau is
not formally subject to "cost-benefit analysis,"" and the
regulatory assessments employed are instead a form of open-
ended balancing." Yet, most financial regulation in the U.S. was
not subject to cost-benefit analysis even before Dodd-Frank. 9
Professor Howell Jackson has detailed the particular difficulties of
quantifying consumer protection benefits in financial regulation,20
whereas costs such as a decline in credit volume are often easy to
allege. 21 On this line of analysis, strict cost-benefit analysis would
consumer financial products and services and that markets for consumer financial
products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive." Id.; see also JOINT
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ATTACHED TO DODD-FRANK BILL 874, available at
http://www.Ilsdc.org/attachments/files/234/PL111-203.pdf ("The Bureau will have the
authority and accountability to ensure that existing consumer protection laws and
regulations are comprehensive, fair, and vigorously enforced."). The Bureau gets
exclusive rulemaking authority with respect to the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, the Equal Opportunity Credit Act, the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act, and other key federal consumer protection laws. Most of these laws'
content was generated prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank. The few exceptions
are outside of Title X of Dodd-Frank. Linda Singer, Zachary Best, & Nina Simon,
Breaking Down Financial Reform, 14 J. CONSUMER & COMMERCIAL LAw 2 (2010).
For example, section 1100E amends the Truth in Lending Act to raise the threshold
for exempt consumer credit transactions from $25,000 to $50,000 and then provides
for annual indexing for inflation. For the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
proposed rulemaking to implement this provision, see 75 Fed. Reg. 78,636 (proposed
Dec. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). The Board's commentary notes,
however, that many creditors already comply with Regulation Z for higher-debt
transactions. Id. at 78,640.
17. Section 1022(b)(2)(A) provides: In prescribing a rule under the Federal
consumer financial laws -
(A) the Bureau shall consider -
(i) the potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered
persons, including the potential reduction of access by consumers
to consumer financial products or services resulting from such a
rule; and
(ii) the impact of the proposed rules on covered persons . .. and
the impact on consumers in rural areas
Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(b) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). More formal
balancing is required for issuing regulations in response to certain state law actions.
18. Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 433, 480-81 (2008).
19. Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation:
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 257 (2007).
20. Id. at 258-60.
21. Although the Bureau is required to consider the decline of credit volume, this
may be an acceptable cost of protecting borrowers and the financial system. Dodd-
[Vol. 15104
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impose an unduly high standard on the Bureau's ability to respond
to well-documented problems in the market for household
financial products.
Furthermore, although it does not require formal cost-
benefit assessments for rulemaking, Dodd-Frank does implement
some express balancing for certain activities. To declare acts and
practices unfair, the Bureau must show it "has a reasonable basis
to conclude that (A) the act or practice causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable
by consumers; and (B) such substantial injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." 22  To
deem a practice "abusive," the Bureau must find that the act or
practice "materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to
understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or
service" or that it takes unreasonable advantage of a consumer's
lack of understanding, inability to avoid the problem, or
reasonable reliance.D Dodd-Frank also specifies the
considerations for expending resources on monitoring consumer
24
credit for risks to borrowers. Thus, Congress required that the
Bureau undertake a balanced analysis in overseeing even the most
serious problems in the consumer credit market.
The Bureau does have the potential to be more effective
than prior regulators in addressing problems in the consumer
credit market. First, Congress has given the Bureau a more
singular focus than the prior regulators.25 Second, the Bureau will
be quite independent. The Bureau ultimately will be an executive
Frank Act § 1022(a)(2)(A) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). Dodd-Frank's
recognition of this point is a much-needed departure from the "more credit is always
better" arguments used in recent legislative debates on personal bankruptcy that I
characterize as "strict liability cost analysis." Similar complaints have been made
about cost-benefit analysis's deterrence of regulation. Shapiro & Schroeder, supra
note 18, at 454.
22. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
23. Id. § 1031(d) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
24. Those considerations include the nature of the risks and costs, whether
consumers are likely to understand those risks, the rates of growth of such credit
products, and the impact on traditionally underserved populations. Dodd-Frank Act
§ 1022(c) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
25. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING DODD-FRANK
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 99-100, 107 (2010).
2011] 105
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agency housed in the Federal Reserve2 6 but is largely insulated
from control by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.27 It is
entitled to appropriations of the Federal Reserve's annual budget
rather than from Congress.2 Appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, the Bureau's Director serves for a five-
year term with significant job protections.29 Unlike agencies
charged with writing rules to protect health and the environment,
the Bureau's rulemaking is not subject to review by the White
House's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. A super-
majority of a new Financial Stability Oversight Council can set
aside a Bureau rule, but under only circumscribed conditions
relating to "the safety and soundness of the United States banking
system" or "the stability of the financial system."0 As Professor
Rachel Barkow recently explained, these institutional design
features render the Bureau better insulated from industry capture
than many other agencies.3 ' Third, the enabling legislation of the
Bureau reinvigorates state consumer protection efforts by
rejecting broad preemption arguments that regulators like the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have asserted in the
past. This permits state actors to pursue consumer protection
26. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
27. Id. § 1012(c) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5492) (establishing Bureau's
autonomy).
28. Id. § 1017(a)(2) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5497) (specifying maximum
percentages of Federal Reserve total operating expenses to be allocated to Bureau,
including 10 percent in fiscal year 2011, 11 percent in 2012, and 12 percent thereafter,
with employment cost index adjustments thereafter). The appropriations to the
Bureau are not subject to review by Congressional committees. Id. § 1017(a)(2)(C)
(to be codified at § 5497).
29. Id. § 1011(b)-(c) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491) (removal of director only
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office).
30. Id. § 1023 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513).
31. Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 66-77 (2010) (comparing the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau to the Consumer Product Safety Commission). See also John F.
Duffy, Innovation and Recovery, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 237, 247-48 (2010)
(discussing "doubly independent" Bureau). Of course, one person's capture is
another person's democratic accountability; according to Peter Wallison, this
insulation is the "worst thing" about the Bureau. PETER J. WALLISON, THE DODD-
FRANK Acr: CREATIVE DESTRUCTION, DESTROYED, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH 5 (2010).
32. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1041-1048 (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
The financial services industry calls this a lack of "uniform national standards" and
remains quite opposed to states' right to set higher standards for protecting its
106 [Vol. 15
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independently and in tandem with the Bureau. Still, these factors
cannot be equated with the form and volume of regulation claimed
by objectors.
In sum, Title X of Dodd-Frank lacks the regulatory
features that objectors suggest.33 Indeed, Dodd-Frank goes in the
opposite direction - for example, by expressly prohibiting the
Bureau from imposing a usury rate. Professor Elizabeth Warren,
who is charged with setting up the agency, has repeatedly
explained the limits of "thou-shalt-not" rules to fix problems in
the consumer credit market." The enabling legislation empowers
governmental (as well as private) parties to analyze data about
financial products in sophisticated ways so that people are poised
to exercise freedom to make important financial decisions.36 In
other words, if the Bureau can make the credit markets more
transparent, people will have the opportunity to make choices that
better fulfill their preferences.37
citizens. Prior to the financial crisis, the Financial Services Roundtable set up a
"grass roots" organization, InFact, to lobby for class action reform, bankruptcy
reform, and related matters. One of its key issues is explaining to consumers that
they are best protected by "uniform national standards" (e.g., if states are precluded
from enforcing their own laws). Uniform National Standards, INFACT,
http://www.bipac.net/page.asp?g=fsr-infact&content=nationalstandards (last visited
Feb. 4, 2011).
33. The CARD Act is closer on the spectrum to command and control in that it
banned some practices and imposed additional discrete requirements on lenders.
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub L. No.
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
34. Dodd-Frank Act §1027(o) (to be codified in 12 U.S.C. § 5517).
35. E.g., David Clarke, Warren Downplays Role of Rules in Consumer Agency,
MSNBC (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38630686/40542173; Sewell
Chan, Consumer Advocate Seeks to Reassure Bankers About Protection Agency, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/business/30warren.html?
ref=consumerfinancialprotectionbureau. Warren also expressed the view that many
current ineffective and burdensome regulations should be eliminated. Dodd-Frank
Act § 1021(d)(3) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511); see also id. § 1100(G)
(amending section 609(d) of title 5 of the United States Code to include the Bureau
among the agencies that must comply with mandated review process for small
business impact).
36. RICHARD H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 140 (Rev'd and Expanded Ed. 2008)
(discussing ways in which private parties can use machine-readable analyses to offer
comparative advice to consumers); Douglas G. Baird, Technology, Information, and
Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 319-21 (2007).
37. THALER, supra note 36, at 95.
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Objectors to the Bureau combined complaints about the
type and volume of regulation with concerns about the scope of
covered persons. They particularly contested the Bureau's
authority over credit extensions by smaller businesses." The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce "ran a multimillion-dollar ad campaign
depicting butchers and others as coming under new financial
regulators" to pressure Congress to abandon or water down the
idea of a standalone agency.39 These complaints ultimately led to
additional provisions that further insulate smaller businesses from
the Bureau's reach.
The key scope provision relevant to this concern, section
1027 of Dodd-Frank, is confusing as ultimately enacted. It
contains exceptions, then exceptions to exceptions, and so forth.4
The upshot seems to be that small businesses that primarily
provide goods and services are carved out from Bureau oversight,
and especially from its rulemaking authority.41  Furthermore,
Dodd-Frank requires the Bureau to avoid unduly burdening small
businesses, providing additional protection.42
The doctor-and-butcher campaign was clever, but
misleading in suggesting that sellers of goods and services were
immune from complaints about financial practices, and also in
suggesting that falling under the Bureau's umbrella would lead
medical providers to encourage patients to pay with high-cost
credit. Only a few years ago, lawmakers from across the political
spectrum expressed concern about the billing and collection
38. See supra note 9.
39. Silla Brush, Dentists Fear Pain from Finance Reform Bill, THE HILL (May 3,
2010), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/95769-dentists-fear-finance-reform-
could-cause-them-some-pain; Brody Mullins, Chamber Ad Campaign Targets
Consumer Agency, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125236911298191113.html.
40. See generally Dodd-Frank Act § 1027(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5517).
41. Dodd-Frank Act § 1027(a)(2)(D) discusses the scope of rulemaking authority
in particular. Even if a person regularly extends credit and the credit is subject to a
finance charge, the person "shall be deemed not to be engaged significantly in
offering or providing consumer financial products or services" if a conjunctive test is
met: the credit is provided only to enable the sale of nonfinancial goods and services,
non-delinquent debt is retained on the person's accounts, and the provider is deemed
a small business under section 3 of the Small Business Act. Sections
1027(a)(2)(D)(iii) and (iv) help determine whether the business meets the SBA
thresholds. Dodd-Frank Act § 1027 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5517).
42. Id.
108 [Vol. 15
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practices of not-for-profit and religiously affiliated hospitals with
respect to uninsured patients. 43  Public debates revealed that
medical providers already have substantial incentives to encourage
patients to use third-party credit." And the health care practice
management industry produces voluminous materials encouraging
providers to seek up-front payment of patients' out-of-pocket
obligations.45
Furthermore, long before creation of the Bureau, courts
and commentators struggled with the application of consumer
credit laws to small businesses such as doctors' offices when they
allow patients to pay in installments." Some clarity on these
issues, and perhaps a safe harbor form, could relieve some of the
uncertainty.
This commentary aimed to briefly explore allegations
about the nature of regulation embodied in the Bureau. Objectors
are not correct that Dodd-Frank inherently reflects a traditional
command and control regulatory model. If objectors maintain that
government has no role to play in household credit markets, or if
they believe that pumping up credit volume trumps all other
43. A Review of Hospital Billing and Collection Practices, Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 1101h Cong. (2004).
44. Id.
45. Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya R. Holman, Jacoby & Holman, Managing Medical
Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICs 239, 248-
256 (2010).
46. Id. at fn 64, 65 (citing sources illustrating that medical providers that extend
credit subject to finance charges may be required to comply with and face potential
liability under federal truth in lending law as well as state credit laws or deceptive
practices statutes). A recent example of Congress pursuing a specific change to
exclude medical providers from credit laws is the Red Flag Program Clarification Act
of 2010, Pub. L. 111-319, 124 Stat. 3457 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1681m) (amending the
Fair Credit Reporting Act to narrow definition of "creditor" for purposes of red flags
rule). FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FIGHTING FRAUD WITH THE RED FLAGS RULE:
A How-To GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 9-10 (2009) (defining "creditor" prior to Red Flag
Program Clarification Act of 2010 to include "businesses or organizations that
regularly defer payment for goods or services and bill customers later. Utility
companies, health care providers, and telecommunications companies are among the
entities that may fall within this definition, depending on how and when they collect
payment for their services.").
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considerations (strict liability cost analysis), then of course the
Bureau will remain unappealing to them. But a closer look reveals
that Title X of Dodd-Frank, which creates the Bureau, invites
regulatory innovation. Objectors and lobbyists were successful in
reducing the scope of the Bureau's authority (I have discussed one
significant example, but there are others). But it is not obvious
that parties such as medical providers benefit from preserving the
ambiguous status quo regarding their payment plans.
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have engaged in
decades of sophisticated thinking about novel forms of industry
regulation that empower private parties. Far from abandoning
that progress, the Bureau presents an important opportunity to put
those ideas to use.
